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101 
HOW MUCH IS THAT DOGGY IN THE WINDOW? 
THE INEVITABLY UNSATISFYING DUTY TO 
MONETIZE 
Adam F. Scales* 
Einstein appears in front of a blackboard.  Before him is an impenetrable 
string of equations, ending, improbably, with a dollar sign.  The caption 
reads, “Einstein discovers that time is actually money.”1
  
 
INTRODUCTION 
It is impossible to imagine effective teaching or scholarship across a 
range of disciplines within the legal academy without some reference to 
economics.  Impossible today, that is.  Generations of students and 
professors did serviceably well before the ongoing transformation of the 
law school into a thoroughgoing academic discipline.  Economic analysis 
most influentially embodies that ambition.  Refracting legal and 
administrative decision-making through the lens of quantified risks and 
benefits is not simply desirable, it is inevitable.  Indeed, a central 
descriptive claim of law and economics is that efficiency and social welfare 
concerns have always animated legal processes.  The descriptive and 
normative claims of law and economics are, of course, open to debate.  
What is assuredly true is that students of the law—regardless of which side 
of the podium they find themselves—must at some point consider the 
material constraints on policy. 
I have been asked to respond to Professor Kip Viscusi’s contribution to 
this Symposium, “Monetizing the Benefits of Risk and Environmental 
Regulation.”2
 
* Associate Professor of Law, Washington and Lee University.  I am grateful to the Journal 
for inviting me to contribute to this Symposium.  Peter Siegelman, Jeff Lubbers, Richard 
Parker, and Kurt Strasser all provided invaluable comments, though this should not be held 
against them.  Finally, I am grateful to Professor Viscusi, whose provocative research has 
stimulated in me both unexpected disagreement, and an eagerness for further inquiry. 
  Professor Viscusi is the leading proponent of cost-benefit 
 1. GARY LARSON, THE FAR SIDE GALLERY 2, 33 (2003). 
 2. W. Kip Viscusi, Monetizing the Benefits of Risk and Environmental Regulation, 33 
FORDHAM URB. L.J. XX (2006) [hereinafter Viscusi, Monetizing the Benefits]. 
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analysis as it applies to regulation.  He is an astonishingly prolific scholar, 
and his work has been as influential within the academy as it has in the 
field. 
As a commenter, I am thus fortunate that this piece breaks no new 
ground, but instead reviews the theory and application of cost-benefit 
analysis.  The range of scholarship on the topic is vast and often technical; 
Professor Viscusi is the rare scholar who can cite extensively to his own 
work without appearing immodest.  That is of immense value to the 
commenter, as it helps him trace for the reader the context of Viscusi’s 
work and some of the increasingly formal critical responses thereto. 
Cost-Benefit Analysis 
Learned Hand would no doubt be pleased to see the remarkable sweep of 
the formula that bears his name.3  Unchained from the colorful—if 
epistemologically inapposite—facts of Carroll Towing,4 cost-benefit 
analysis now occupies a central role in administrative regulation.  Viscusi 
describes the relatively recent promulgation by the United States Office of 
Management and Budget (OMB) of standards to guide federal agencies as 
they consider very explicit tradeoffs among health outcomes, direct 
compliance costs, and the diverse outputs of regulation.5  These 
considerations are essential to enable policymakers to make rational and 
consistent risk decisions across different policy domains.6
 
 3. United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d. 169 (2d Cir. 1947).  Hand’s rule for 
negligence, simply stated, holds that when P is the probability of an event, L the amount of 
loss resulting from that event, and B the burden on the defendant to prevent the event from 
occurring, negligence results where B < P(L).  Id. at 173. 
  It is important 
to know that, for example, Regulation X leaves society better off if enacted.  
Somewhat less obviously, we ought to prefer Regulation Y to Regulation X 
if Y leaves us even better off.  In a world of constrained regulatory 
 4. See Stephen G. Gilles, U.S. v. Carroll Towing Co.: The Hand Formula’s Home 
Port, in TORTS STORIES (Robert L. Rabin & Stephen D. Sugarman eds., 2003). 
 5. Viscusi, Monetizing the Benefits, supra note 2, at XX. 
 6. One might distinguish the need for consistency across the spectrum of regulatory 
risk choices from those made by individuals.  Viscusi offers intriguing data suggesting a 
great deal of correlation between different types of individual risk choices not obviously 
related to one another.  For example, he presents data showing that smokers are ten percent 
less likely to wear seatbelts and twice as likely to suffer an accident at home.  Nor do they 
floss as often as nonsmokers.  Id. at XX.  This implies that there is some underlying taste for 
risk that expresses itself across different choices.  But this does not entail that individuals 
consistently express these tastes, even though risk tendencies can be observed at the level of 
populations.  The upshot for Viscusi’s analysis is this: perhaps it is desirable to determine 
regulatory policy based on consistent risk preferences.  But this ought not to be confused 
with an observation that, in fact, individuals do so (with the implication that risk-consistent 
regulatory policies merely instantiate that preference). 
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possibilities, some mechanism is needed to sort out the good ideas from the 
bad, as well as the better ideas from the merely good. 
Cost-benefit analysis (“CBA”) offers such a mechanism.  But because 
“costs” are initially denominated in dollars and “benefits” typically do not 
self-denominate accordingly, direct comparisons are difficult.  Instead, 
researchers have derived estimates of dollar values from observed market 
behavior and survey data.  Human health and safety are sometimes directly 
traded (as in the provision of health care or shelter).  More often than not, 
however, we can only observe transactions in which health and safety 
considerations are merely implicit.  Statistical tools are employed to tease 
out the component of the transaction (say a wage premium) that is thought 
to be attributable to risk.  Thus armed with the “market rate” for a quantum 
and type of health risk, one can infer what an actual market would look like 
for a spectrum of risk portfolios. 
These market estimates may be supplemented with survey data.  
Contingent valuation is a process wherein participants are asked to behave 
like market actors where they may transact for health and safety-
denominated goods.  A famous example is the fascinating if unwieldy 
finding that shoppers in Greensboro, North Carolina state a willingness to 
pay $883,000 to avoid a lifetime of chronic bronchitis.7
These observations reach fructuation with the concept of VSL, or “value 
of a statistical life.”  As the name implies, and Viscusi is careful to note, 
the term describes a sum of money, which for regulatory purposes may be 
regarded as equivalent to society’s willingness to pay to avoid the loss of a 
human life.
 
8
There is much to commend the VSL concept.  Every torts teacher walks 
his class through a series of hypothetical scenarios involving road safety or 
some other good, and asks some lucky student how much we should spend 
to make cars safer.  Every year, someone resists, drawn by some 
innominate and inarticulable sense that such comparisons are simply 
wrong.  After a few laps around the rhetoric of risk reduction, the now-
unfortunate student confesses that, yes, it doesn’t make sense to spend $4 
trillion to save an inattentive driver’s life, but, no—making such tradeoffs 
  VSL is a thought experiment that assigns a monetary value to 
the benefits of regulatory choices—an experiment that is itself derived 
from the natural and artificial experiments sketched above.  VSL 
methodology has been in use for decades, though it has seen increasing 
refinement (and a dramatic rise in inferred values) since the late 1980s. 
 
 7. FRANK ACKERMAN & LISA HEINZERLING, PRICELESS: ON KNOWING THE PRICE OF 
EVERYTHING, AND THE VALUE OF NOTHING 96 (2005). 
 8. Viscusi, Monetizing the Benefits, supra note 2, at __. 
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is still wrong. 
There are actually more sophisticated arguments, from a variety of 
perspectives on this score,9 but at the end of the day we must decide 
whether to spend X dollars (rather than X-n, or X+n), on safety.  We 
deserve to know what we’re getting for our money.  The regulatory 
bureaucracy has largely embraced VSL, and Viscusi and others deserve 
credit for insisting on the use of economic tools in making decisions with 
economic consequences.10
Moreover, while the range of VSLs computed (and, somewhat 
discouragingly, actually used) varies significantly (between $1 million and 
$30 million), it is interesting to note, as Viscusi observes, that there is 
significant clustering of estimates.
 
11
I think it appropriate to emphasize those important qualifiers: 
“something” and “modest.”  The CBA project is an impressive, ongoing 
technical achievement.  If one believes the task of economics is to 
illuminate the costs of social choices, as I do, Professor Viscusi has done 
much to illuminate the costs of regulation.  The state of the art is such, he 
argues, that relatively minor disputes about methodology should not 
obscure the necessity and benefit of CBA.
  In other words, the methodologies 
commonly employed do not derive values of $50,000 for one domain, and 
$3 billion for another.  This suggests that VSL methodology is in fact 
measuring something with modest consistency. 
12
Willingness To Pay 
  But I believe the reach of this 
science has exceeded its present grasp; as a “back of the envelope” admirer 
of law and economics, I am in the uncomfortable position of finding that 
admiration somewhat dulled by my inquiries here. 
Let us consider first the willingness-to-pay measure (“WTP”).  From 
market transactions and surveys, Viscusi and others have derived estimates 
of how much people would pay to avoid small risks of death; these sums 
 
 9. See, e.g., MARGARET RADIN, CONTESTED COMMODITIES (1996); Heidi Li Feldman, 
Harm and Money: Against the Insurance Theory of Compensation, 75 TEX. L. REV. 1567 
(1997). 
 10. Richard Parker and others observe that CBA analyses lend themselves to the view 
that there exists a finite regulatory budget.  See Richard W. Parker, Grading the 
Government, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 1345, 1345-75 (2003).  This is literally untrue.  However, 
the practical constraints on health and safety expenditure mean that we are very unlikely to 
undertake all regulations equally; some ranking is required, and that will inevitably involve 
cost-benefit calculations. 
 11. Viscusi, Monetizing the Benefits, supra note 2, at __. 
 12. Id. at XX-XX (stressing the importance of cost-benefit analysis and the successful 
use of various methodologies to measure it). 
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may be scaled up to reflect what people ought to be willing to pay to avoid 
certain death—for someone.13  I add that term because presumably, any 
individual would spend all of his wealth to avoid certain death.14
WTP is attractive because most transactions are made for the benefit of 
the transacting parties, not others.  Viscusi’s theory is that our collective 
willingness to pay (for safety regulation) ought to reflect the average 
WTP.
  The 
disutility function of death risks (and the concomitant WTP) are non-linear.  
The first problem is the selection of WTP measures. 
15  I have no doubt that this is an attractive view among economists, 
but I think it fundamentally misperceives regulatory wealth transfers.  A 
health regulation can be evaluated under WTP, or “willingness to accept” 
(“WTA”).  Viscusi observes that in experimental contexts, observed WTA 
values are significantly higher than WTP.16
Imagine a homeowner who purchases a home for $100,000.  What is the 
value to her?  Well, it must be something more than $100,000—otherwise 
the transaction would not be worthwhile.  Still, her WTP is not likely to 
significantly exceed $100,000.  Once she takes possession, it becomes very 
unlikely that her willingness to accept would not significantly exceed 
$100,000.  Which is the correct figure?  Both are useful.  It is natural to 
think that individual WTP should be mirrored in collective WTP for 
regulatory action, but I do not believe that most people actually think about 
it this way.  Consider the near-universal condemnation of Kelo v. City of 
New London.
  There is every reason to think 
that this value is closer to what citizens expect of their government because 
most regulation is inherently other-regarding.  The real question—or at 
least one likely to lead to very different valuations—is the willingness to 
impose risks on others.  I call this “willingness to impose” (“WTI”)—and 
Professor Viscusi can correct me if there is a more precise term extant.  A 
regulatory scheme that elevates WTP-derived measures over others suffers 
from two deficiencies: first, it is biased in favor of market-based data, 
because most WTP measures are derived therefrom.  If, therefore, market-
based data is systematically biased in one direction or another, WTP-based 
regulatory measures will suffer corresponding error.  Secondly, it overlooks 
the panoply of considerations, not captured by market observations, which 
people probably entertain when exercising regulatory power over others. 
17
 
 13. Id. at XX. 
  Legislatures have introduced bills to restrict state power to 
 14. Viscusi implies a wealth constraint, but I am not so sure.  See Id. at XX; cf. infra 
note 16 and accompanying text. 
 15. Viscusi, Monetizing the Benefits, supra note 2, at XX. 
 16. Id. at XX. 
 17. 125 S. Ct. 2655 (2005). 
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take property for private use.18  The opinion’s author even concedes that 
the outcome was unwise.19
It is worth noting that Viscusi’s cited literature does in fact support this 
intuition, though he does not emphasize it. When respondents are asked to 
attach WTP values for risks to be borne by others (altruism), the values 
thereof are reliably several times higher than self-regarding WTP.
  What explains this reaction?  I suspect part of 
the problem is the mismatch between WTA and WTP in such cases. 
20
Note that something more than altruism is at work here.  I use the term 
WTI to illustrate that some regulatory choices
  I do 
not understand why, in a regulatory context, self-regarding measures 
should be given analytical priority.  Virtually all regulation is other-
regarding: for example, I am to pay (let us assume through taxation) a sum 
certain to eliminate a one-in-100,000 risk of death.  The risk to me 
personally is trivial.  The risk to one of my fellow citizens is all but 
certain—I simply cannot identify him in advance.  Assuming my complete 
willingness to monetize risk-life tradeoffs, the regulatory deal I am being 
offered is to trade a sum certain to save someone else’s life.  Viscusi would 
be very correct to point out that my WTP is unlikely to be limitless.  But a 
modest amount of empathy may reveal a true preference for enhancing 
other-regarding welfare in ways not captured by my personal spending 
habits.  It is for this reason that I feel comfortable predicting that most 
people would support an enhancement or “lodestar” approach to 
compensating homeowners who lose their homes to eminent domain. 
21
 
 18. See, e.g., S.F. 2750, 109th.Cong. (2006). 
 reflect conscious decisions 
to transfer resources from private to public hands.  Those resources could 
be physical property, unliquidated damage claims, or health status.  I am 
personally very skeptical of government power, so I assume that people on 
whom it is necessarily inflicted for the greater good take unique umbrage.  
Specifically, the claims one may validly make upon the market are very 
different than those one may make as a citizen.  Unreconstructed WTP 
measures do not reflect this, and the mysteriously underemphasized 
“altruism” enhancement may only partially describe the reluctance people 
have in visiting unelected risks upon others through government. 
 19. Kelo, 126 U.S. at 2668; see also Linda Greenhouse, Supreme Court Memo; Justice 
Weighs Desire v. Duty (Duty Prevails), N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 25, 2005, at A1. 
 20. See, e.g., W. Kip Viscusi, The Value of Risks to Life and Health, 31 J. ECON. 
LITERATURE 1912, 1940 (1993). 
 21. I refer here to direct regulatory outlays, such as the decision to commit resources to 
cleaning up a polluted stream, rather than regulation that requires private actors to pay.  As 
Viscusi notes in a different context, drawing this distinction permits us properly to consider 
different VSLs (and thus necessarily different WTPs).  See infra notes 30 and 31 and 
accompanying text.  
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VSL analysis does not deal easily with entitlements that people do not 
consistently express across time, different wealth states, or market and non-
market domains.  There is, of course, a great deal of literature on this topic, 
and I am skeptical whether measures emphasized by Viscusi adequately 
account for its insights.  If so, then his analysis will systematically 
undervalue the benefits of regulatory action (or, expressed another way, 
undervalue the costs of health risk transfers). 
Viscusi points out a number of improvements that robust CBA analysis 
provides over prior metrics.22  For one thing, it offers a syntax for 
describing benefits (such as visibility due to improved air quality) that 
simply could not be expressed with commensurable precision otherwise.23  
Moreover, WTP measures, in theory, are better suited for capturing losses 
for death or pain that the tort system, with frustrating formality, insists on 
characterizing in strictly pecuniary terms (i.e., most states nominally permit 
wrongful death damages to account for loss of income, not an abstract 
value for loss of life).24
Nonetheless, the economic analyses Viscusi describes often insert 
assumptions that “flatten” or smooth out what will in reality tend to be 
rather lumpy distributions.  For example, in describing a hypothetical 
chemical regulation, he states that the relevant benefit outcome against 
which costs are to be measured is the mean value of the distribution based 
on the dose-response relationship.
 
25  This is plausible, but relies heavily on 
a measure of risk indifference that exists only in economic models.  As 
Viscusi correctly notes, individuals’ responses to deaths or injuries are not 
uniform; they may have a particular fear of cancer, or of disfigurement.26
Calculating VSLs 
  
This may cause them to assign outsized values to particular risks.  Viscusi 
recognizes this limitation, but only as a source of possible error in 
regulatory decisions.  He does not assign it independent weight as a data 
point that might be used to shape the “correct” regulatory response.  This is 
a rather thin conception of regulatory rationality, to which I shall return 
later. 
Viscusi provides a revealing example for using VSL.  He imagines, 
similarly to my example above, a one-in-100,000 risk of death that can be 
 
 22. Viscusi, Monetizing the Benefits, supra note 2, at __. 
 23. Id. at __. 
 24. Id. at __. 
 25. Id. at __. 
 26. Id. at __. 
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eliminated.27  The question is, “how much would you pay” to do so?  If the 
answer is $70, then there is an implied VSL of $7 million.28  The first item 
of note is the strong appeal to insurance analogy.  The problem is that 
insurance behavior rarely looks anything like this.  People exhibit all kinds 
of irrational preferences, under-insuring relative to the expected value of 
their earnings (including this author, a professor of insurance law), and 
over-insuring relative to the likelihood of certain, highly-salient risks (such 
as accidents).29
Another point is subtle.  Viscusi observes that, as we are dealing with 
small risks of death in most regulatory actions, the VSL implied by the 
above hypothetical need not be constrained by the present value of the 
individual’s wealth.
  This poses a fundamental problem for VSL methodology 
because life insurance is about as close a transaction as it is possible to find 
in which individuals self-valuate.  If the reasonably transparent life 
insurance market is an extremely unreliable indicator of life values, it is not 
clear why esoteric decisions regarding seat belts, smoking, or implicit wage 
premia would be better. 
30  He then links this observation with the recognition 
that the implied VSL would be “different” for much greater risks.31
Viscusi has acknowledged previously that the heterogeneity of risk 
preferences limits the generalizability of implied VSLs.
  
Different, indeed; the VSL would be astronomically higher.  For example, I 
am an unusually risk-averse person.  My students always make fun of my 
grandmotherly driving habits.  But I suppose I would be willing to play 
Regulatory Roulette: for $100,000 I am willing to sell the right to expose 
myself to a one-in-100 risk of immediate death.  But for a five percent 
chance, I would not take less than $1 million.  And it only goes up from 
there. 
32
 
 27. Id. at __. 
  But this is also 
the case—perhaps dramatically so—with risk-variant VSLs.  But Viscusi 
does not suggest, nor do the regulatory examples he cites imply, that the 
VSL used in evaluating regulations imposing one-in-100,000 risks are 
adjusted upwards when one-in-10,000 risks are under consideration.  
Putting these two ideas together, it is clear just how much “smoothing” is 
required by Viscusi’s model: not only is the amount of risk preference 
 28. Id. at __. 
 29. See generally Kyle Logue, The Current Life Insurance Crisis: How the Law Should 
Respond, 32 CUMB. L. REV. 1 (2002); Adam F. Scales, Man, God and the Serbonian Bog: 
The Evolution of Accidental Death Insurance, 86 IOWA L. REV. 173 (2000). 
 30. Viscusi, Monetizing the Benefits, supra note 2, at __. 
 31. Id. 
 32. Id. at XX. 
SCALES_CHRISTENSEN 2/3/2011  10:24 PM 
2006] DOGGY IN THE WINDOW 109 
certain to be wrong for almost everyone (though correct for that hardy 
staple of economic thought, the average person), but the VSL would be 
correct for him only with respect to—at best—the average risk-imposing 
regulation.  And even this modest illumination depends critically on the 
accuracy of stated preference and implied risk premium calculations, and 
the robustness with which they can describe varying levels of risk. 
I offer a final observation regarding this example.  While a perfectly-
functioning explicit market for risk would likely constrain an individual’s 
risk-eliminating purchasing power to something like the present value of 
his wealth, there is no reason to suppose this constraint applies equally to 
all implicit political markets in risk.  All government activity is 
redistributive; the question is simply the opacity with which the 
redistribution takes place.  VSL methodology seeks a kind of “soft” 
internalization of regulatory costs among risk-affected populations.  I find 
this personally appealing, but that is largely because I find redistribution 
generally unappealing.  But that is not how political processes work, and 
most people would not agree with my Paleolithic views.  If this is so, then 
we must ask whether markets are truly revealing collective preferences.33
Moreover, limiting the VSL to “owned” wealth ignores the diverse 
sources of wealth individuals may call upon under exigency: family, public 
appeals to charity, and of course direct government intervention.  As many 
of these are in fact observable—a point I develop later—I am puzzled as to 
why these sources should not be included in the WTP calculus. 
 
Bronchitis and Potato Chips 
When I was in law school, I had the privilege of being a research 
assistant for a distinguished scholar I will not impugn by association here.  
He asked me to research the then-emerging field of contingent valuation 
methodology (“CVM”).  I found that the state of the art was well-described 
by a cheeky law review title, “Ask a Silly Question . . . ”.34
Professor Viscusi and others have elaborated considerably on the simple 
methods then available to probe preferences that cannot be naturally 
observed. Their refinements can be seen in the indirectness with which 
valuation questions are posed, and the use of iterative choices to “close” the 
expressed preferences of research subjects.  Moreover, some of the early 
inconsistencies described in the CVM literature (apparent indifference to 
 
 
 33. See infra note 67 and accompanying text for a discussion of “collective” decision-
making versus aggregated individual decisions. 
 34. Note, “Ask A Silly Question . . .”: Contingent Valuation of Natural Resource 
Damages, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1981 (1992) [hereinafter Ask a Silly Question]. 
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the numbers of species saved per unit of cost) have been overcome to the 
point that a surface plausibility emerges.  For example, in a study Viscusi 
co-authored several years ago, respondents considered risks of treatable 
and non-treatable diseases and accidents.35  Unsurprisingly, people treat the 
disutility of terminal cancer and a fatal crash very similarly.36  Cleverly, 
Viscusi corroborated these putative preferences by generating survey data 
tied to the physical consequences (not simply the names) of the diseases.37
I find this work elegant and fascinating.  The mathematics are cunningly 
worked out, and as someone who studies the allocation of injury and 
disease costs, I cannot help but be inspired to develop the empirical chops 
necessarily to explore such findings more fully.  The problem is, I can’t get 
the ATMs out of my mind. 
  
The correlation is strong, indicating that people are being relatively 
consistent in their responses. 
I refer to the computerized testing machines that researchers have wisely 
substituted for human interrogators in these surveys.38
Why on earth would we care to hear their opinions about how much they 
might accept in return for chronic bronchitis—a sum not one in a thousand 
has ever seen?  In what way does their apparent expertise in selecting 
detergent and potato chips for national marketing qualify them to determine 
the regulatory policy of the Environmental Protection Agency?  Asking 
someone how much she might pay to avoid a disease so far outside of 
common experience that the researcher must take pains to educate her in 
  Respondents 
answer questions appearing before them on a computer monitor.  We are 
thus deriving our estimates of the value of human life from bored shoppers 
in a North Carolina mall who ponder the price of avoiding chronic 
bronchitis in between slurps of Orange Julius.  I would not expect these 
people to be able to correctly identify the Chairman of the Federal Reserve, 
the approximate size of the federal budget, or their own Congressman.  If 
they could define “MRI,” I would be astounded if they knew its 
approximate cost (many doctors did not as late as fifteen years ago).  They 
certainly would misstate the relative likelihood of sustaining a head injury 
in car collisions across different models, are still unsure how to operate 
ABS, and would be floored to discover that only 4.2 percent of deaths 
result from accident. 
 
 35. Wesley Magat et al., A Reference Lottery Metric for Valuing Health, 42 MGMT. SCI. 
1118, 1119 (1996).  
 36. Id. at 1123. 
 37. Id.  
 38. Id. at 1122. 
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advance39 is not simply a silly question; it is a wholly fantastical 
question.40
At this point, I have a perhaps-silly question of my own.  Do CBA 
proponents have the same confidence in civil juries?
 
41  My inquiries have 
only scratched the surface of Professor Viscusi’s work.  I am hesitant—
more so I suspect than Professors Heinzerling and Ackerman42—to impute 
to it the broadly deregulatory agenda with which some CBA enthusiasts 
are, interestingly enough, also allied.  Therefore, let me address the 
question to myself.  I am gravely skeptical of the competence of juries to 
assess even modestly complex risk-relevant information.  The misleadingly 
one-dimensional character of tort litigation systematically biases jurors to 
elevate presently materialized risks over those external to the case at hand.  
The limited (and adversarial) guidance given to jurors when they assess 
compensation would be unthinkable in nearly any other public decision-
making context. Certainly, there are matters of reasonableness I would 
sooner entrust to the first twelve people I could find in Central Park, rather 
than the elite and entirely unrepresentative and impractical professoriate I 
know so well.  But just as I would not trust those twelve people to 
recommend medication to me or deliver a baby, I see little reason to 
imagine they are competent to evaluate the physician who does, 
particularly in view of the systematic ways civil trials inhibit the rational 
processing of information.43
Next to the survey methods on which Professor Viscusi lays such 
emphasis, the civil jury trial is practically a contemporary policy seminar!  
Nor am I impressed with the observed “stability” of iterative choice 
methods he describes.
 
44
 
 39. Id. at 1121. 
  Twenty-five or more jury verdicts are highly likely 
to yield an accurate assessment of Merck’s average liability for Vioxx 
cases.  Like the surveys, this is an interesting number, and it can be put to 
some use.  But for all we know, the juries merely express the same 
cognitive limitations iteration after iteration; consistency must not be 
mistaken for external truth. 
 40. It would be equally informative (and perhaps more entertaining) to drop this author 
onto the set of “Who Wants to Be a Millionaire?” and ask him to differentiate between logit, 
probit and Tobit, which numerate readers will quickly recognize as the kind of linear 
regression models econometricians such as Viscusi commonly employ. 
 41. Evidently not.  See, e.g., W. Kip Viscusi, Jurors, Judges, and the Mistreatment of 
Risk by the Courts, 30 J. LEGAL STUD. 107 (2001) [hereinafter Viscusi, Jurors, Judges]. 
 42. ACKERMAN & HEINZERLING, supra note 7, at 56-59. 
 43. Viscusi, Jurors, Judges, supra note 41, at 135. 
 44. See, e.g., Viscusi, Monetizing the Benefits, supra note 2, at __. 
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Wage Differentials 
Although the method sketched above is employed to fill in certain 
valuation gaps, Viscusi is careful to note that they are not actual 
decisions.45  The true test of individuals’ values for risk comes from market 
data.  Workers will be compensated for risky work, and consumers will pay 
less for risky products (expressed here as a premium for safe products).  
Summarizing his recent meta-analysis of wage-risk differential data from 
dozens of studies, Viscusi derives a median VSL of  $6.7 million (adjusted 
to $7.1 million for inflation).46  Looking at a number of products-related 
surveys, VSLs are also clustered around $4-5 million, across a spectrum of 
purchase decisions.47
It is indeed interesting to note the general consistency of these 
valuations.  This consistency matches neatly with the theoretical prediction 
that rational actors with a certain and stable taste for risk should act 
consistently with that taste across their various activities.  Perhaps too 
neatly.  I certainly find the theory plausible, and would have assumed 
(subject to qualification) that it was likely to be borne out by examination. 
 
In preparation for receiving Professor Viscusi’s paper, I read up on 
VSLs.  I read Priceless,48 and other works from different schools of 
thought within labor economics.49  One fact leapt out at me: the observed 
risk premia were astonishingly small.  Ackerman and Heinzerling reported 
typical premia of thirty cents per hour, rising to about one dollar per hour 
for the handful of riskiest jobs.50  Two thousand dollars a year? I must 
confess my surprise.  Perhaps I was imagining high value-added jobs 
(putting out oil fires) when I should have been thinking about convenience 
store employees.  Sure enough, Viscusi describes a hypothetical typical 
worker exposed to a one-in-25,000 risk who receives an implied premium 
of $268 annually.51
From an actuarial standpoint, the math works out fine.  But my 
immediate intuition was one of skepticism: what is the signal (risk 
premium) to noise (myriad factors determining compensation) ratio here?  
 
 
 45. Id. at __. 
 46. Id. at __. 
 47. Id. at __. 
 48. ACKERMAN & HEINZERLING, supra note 7. 
 49. See, e.g., Peter Dorman & Paul Hagstrom, Wage Compensation for Dangerous Work 
Revisited, 52 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 116 (1998); Morley Gunderson & Douglass Hyatt, 
Workplace Risks and Wages: Canadian Evidence From Alternative Models, 34 CANADIAN J. 
ECON. 377 (2001). 
 50. ACKERMAN & HEINZERLING, supra note 7, at 80. 
 51. Viscusi, Monetizing the Benefits, supra note 2, at __. 
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An amount of $268 is less than one percent of the average annual wage in 
the United States.52
Let me emphasize my relative unfamiliarity with labor economics and 
statistics.  Viscusi has surely forgotten more than I am likely to learn.  Yet, 
I cannot help but notice that many of these studies draw from diverse data 
sets compiled at different times for different purposes.  Each has its own set 
of assumptions, limitations and “patches.”  This is not unique to labor 
economics, but is a fundamental challenge throughout social science; one 
can almost never observe everything with consistency.  It is common for 
such studies to rely in part on datasets that are twenty years old.  I do not 
see how simply adjusting for inflation could possibly yield accurate values, 
across many dimensions, for today’s workforce. That problem is only 
compounded when one considers the long-tail nature of regulatory 
decisions.  The best snapshot of the world today will be used to guide risk 
decisions impacting people twenty years from now. 
  Assuming that a risk premium is an innate component 
of compensation, I wonder about how reliably we can ascertain it. 
There is no obviously correct solution to this problem, and paralysis by 
analysis is uniquely unattractive.  But certainly we must proceed with great 
caution before setting too much store beside our already-outdated 
calculations.  One need only observe the profound changes in VSL 
methodology and results Viscusi describes as having occurred in a 
relatively short time to confirm this.53
These cautionary notes would ring true in a world of perfectly 
competitive labor markets.  Labor markets, however, are not perfectly 
competitive.  A number of scholars have reported that minorities, women, 
and other disadvantaged workers are less likely to command wage premia 
commensurate with risky work.
 
54
 
 52. Social Security Online, Average Wage Index (AWI), available at 
http://www.ssa.gov/OACT/COLA/awidevelop.html (last visited Apr. 6, 2006). 
  Viscusi reports also that smokers are 
more likely to be injured, controlling for job risk, and has elsewhere 
 53. Viscusi says that VSLs have been stable for some time.  Viscusi, Monetizing the 
Benefits, supra note 2, at __.  But I believe he must be referring to research done over the 
past twenty years or so. 
 54. See, e.g., Joni Hersch, Compensating Differentials for Gender-Specific Job Injury 
Risks, 88 AM. ECON. REV. 598 (1998); W. Kip Viscusi, Racial Difference in Labor Market 
Values of a Statistical Life, 27 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 239 (2003).  Hersch (and Viscusi) do 
note the presence of compensating differentials for women, but Hersch’s data imply a lower 
VSL for women; it is likely that either the data are insufficiently resolved to point to the 
correct VSL (which I believe may be Hersch’s interpretation, see Hersch, supra, at 607), or 
women workers may simply be “unlucky,” in Dorman and Hagstrom’s terms.  See Dorman 
& Hagstrom, supra note 49, at 133.  The strong hand of noncompetitive factors in 
determining wage-risk tradeoffs counsels caution in extrapolating regulatory policy from 
voluminous, yet misleading, data. 
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adduced data that smokers require smaller wage-risk premia.55
The sex- and race-related data illustrate this problem of extrapolation.  
Heinzerling and Ackerman suggest that not only are women less likely to 
command wage premia (presumably because of discrimination),
  Again, this 
points towards the conclusion that wage-risk measures capture some 
underlying preference for risk.  But, unless workers express this preference 
consistently (within the heterogeneous domains different workers inhabit), 
it is unclear how this observation should be translated into regulatory 
policy, except in a general way. This is a perennial problem with VSL 
methodology: one is required to have robust confidence in the observable 
expression of risk preferences and the ability to scale those preferences up 
to a regulated domain that may involve different or unobservable risk 
preferences.  The many caveats that appear throughout the underlying VSL 
literature are not in my view consistent with such confidence. 
56 but are 
significantly more risk averse—perhaps six or seven times more so than 
men.57
Viscusi himself recognizes that VSLs for regulatory purposes might 
appropriately vary depending on the character of the regulation.
  Most risky jobs are held by men.  Ought not the VSL for regulatory 
purposes be adjusted upwards?  After all, environmental health regulation 
affects everybody, not just men.  If women really are six times more risk 
averse than men (at least with respect to environmental hazards), then the 
population-level VSL should be approximately three times higher. 
58  Using 
his example of airline safety versus road safety,59 I would generalize as 
follows: where the regulation supplements a market transaction, the 
regulation should reflect, as best as we can determine, the expressed VSL 
of the affected population.60
 
 55. Joni Hersch & W. Kip Viscusi, Cigarette Smoking, Seatbelt Use, and Differences in 
Wage-Risk Tradeoffs, 15 J. HUM. RESOURCES 202 (1990). 
  Therefore, if we really knew that workers 
 56. ACKERMAN & HEINZERLING, supra note 7, at 78.  Viscusi, relying on Hersch, replies 
that women do in fact command wage-risk premia.  Viscusi, Monetizing the Benefits, supra 
note 2, at XX.  But I do not read Hersch to assert that these premia are commensurate with 
higher levels of risk aversion.   
 57. Viscusi, Monetizing the Benefits, supra note 2, at __. 
 58. Id. at XX. 
 59. Id. at XX.  Viscusi suggests that the higher incomes of airline passengers should 
determine higher regulated investments in airline safety—and perhaps higher than what 
should be imposed on members of the general population (whose lower income implies a 
lower VSL).  Id. 
 60. My generalization is incomplete; at some point, the transaction costs of an imagined 
private transaction are so high, it is no longer sensible to speak of the “market” at work at 
all.  For example, perhaps it is plausible to assume that residents in a factory town are 
capable of reaching some arrangement as to pollution-employment tradeoffs that reasonably 
reflect their preferences.  However, if the affected population is dispersed over hundreds of 
miles from a pollution source, it is perhaps better to regard regulation not as a response to an 
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valued their lives at $7.1 million, that figure is an appropriate basis for 
filling the “gaps” in worker safety measures privately agreed.  On the other 
hand, if we are funding health measures from a public regulatory budget for 
general benefit, we will necessarily consider a more diverse set of risk 
preferences (along with the WTI and WTA considerations described 
earlier).  Given this concession, should we confine VSLs derived from 
wage-risk studies to the task of workplace regulation (of risk-preferring 
white guys)?  Actually, there may be unexpected wisdom there. Workers 
with the highest VSLs may represent the heterogeneity of risk preference 
(as I believe Viscusi would argue), or may represent the furthest plausible 
range of life valuations derivable from market studies.  Why should not that 
highest expressed value, rather than average VSL, be used for regulatory 
decisions, at least for “public” or “market-forcing” regulations? 
Product Safety and Heroic Interventions 
With regard to products-based risk-differentials, my perspective is 
constrained by years of studying and teaching products liability.  That 
experience has confirmed that the average person knows almost nothing 
about product safety.  Professor Viscusi provides only a brief resume of 
WTP measures derived from seatbelt usage decisions and purchases of new 
cars.61  I have looked only at some of this data.  Calculating a VSL based 
on the fraction of work-opportunity cost expended by putting on a seatbelt 
is facetious.62  Moreover, I happen to be a car fanatic, and follow the auto 
market with some care.  I cannot accept as plausible the suggestion that 
rising car prices reflect rising safety levels.63  How do competitive market 
models for risk account for the fact that, until quite recently, manufacturers 
were pulling down a profit of $15,000 on their larger SUVs despite the fact 
that they are not safer than mid- or full-sized cars, as many people 
imagine?64
One of the interesting questions Viscusi raises is whether VSL 
  There is so much “noise” in the automotive purchase decision 
that I cannot believe it resolves VSLs with the superfine granularity 
Professor Viscusi discerns. 
 
imperfectly-executed transaction, but rather as a substitute for a failed one. 
 61. W. Kip Viscusi & Joseph Aldy, The Value of A Statistical Life: A Critical Review of 
Market Estimates Throughout the World, 27 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 5, 25-26 (2003). 
 62. Viscusi, Monetizing the Benefits, supra note 2, at XX (referring to Viscusi & Aldy’s 
literature review cited supra, note 61, at 24). 
 63. Certainly, this is true in the Yugo and Daewoo stratum, but many luxury cars have 
lower crash test scores than family sedans. 
 64. See Michelene Maynard, Trading the Hummer for a Honda, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 18, 
2006, at C1; NAT’L HIGHWAY TRAFFIC & SAFETY ADMIN., PASSENGER VEHICLE OCCUPANT 
FATALITY RATES BY TYPE AND SIZE OF VEHICLE (2006). 
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methodology can be used to guide the kind of emergency intervention 
decisions that are familiar to anyone who watches television.65  Images like 
that of a girl trapped in a well, or of coal miners trapped in a subterranean 
shaft, often inspire heroic efforts at rescue.  Rarely if ever is there any 
discussion of cost—except perhaps to impress the observer with the size 
and rarity of equipment being used.  Viscusi does not directly answer his 
own question, which is itself interesting.  Instead, he asks whether society 
would be willing to make equivalent expenditures to rescue, for example, 
the 45,000 people killed each year in traffic accidents.66
This is a fair question.  I detect little enthusiasm for posting a full 
complement of EMTs at every traffic stop.  But Professor Viscusi might do 
well to reflect on his question from the perspective of the economist that he 
is.  These heroic interventions represent natural experiments rich with data.  
In each, we have a collective decision being made to save a number of lives 
identifiable with the kind of precision of which regulatory economists can 
only dream.  Are these not the very best data points from which to derive 
society’s willingness to pay for human life?  At a minimum, it would be 
interesting to observe at what points of expenditure safety officials (with 
tacit public consent) conclude that they have done all that they reasonably 
can.  This explicit decision data might be blended with other (often implicit 
and difficult to measure) data from market studies to arrive at a more 
nuanced approximation of social WTP.
 
67
Risk-Risk Tradeoffs 
 
Viscusi points to additional indirect costs of regulation.68  He then 
applies a measure he has previously derived for propensity to spend income 
on health (and finds that it is 0.1).69  Therefore, a $1 million loss of wealth 
implies $100,000 less spent on health.  Applying a simple VSL, he 
concludes that $70 million of regulation results in the loss of one statistical 
life.70  Viscusi notes that other “propensity” measures and different VSLs 
obviously result in very different calculations.71
 
 65. Viscusi, Monetizing the Benefits, supra note 
 
2, at XX. 
 66. Id. at XX. 
 67. One might argue that decisions made while a telegenic family pleads before the 
cameras for a child’s rescue may be a far cry from the dispassionate analysis said to be the 
strength of regulatory decision-making.  I agree, but Viscusi does not subject market 
determinations to the same scrutiny.  These decisions may be just as irrational (though 
informative) as any other decision. 
 68. Viscusi, Monetizing the Benefits, supra note 2, at XX. 
 69. Id. at __. 
 70. Id. 
 71. Id. at __. 
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This small methodological point must nevertheless be kept firmly in 
mind.  The econometric measures that Viscusi finds plausible will generate 
dramatically different estimates of the number of “statistical murders”72
On some level, Viscusi’s observation must be sound.  One can easily 
imagine a workplace regulation that is so costly, the employer cannot 
afford to operate, and the employees lose their jobs.  No doubt, one could 
trace the effects of these layoffs as they reverberate through the economy 
(though Professor Ackerman suggests some unrecognized complications 
here).
 
caused by inefficient regulation.  There is a tendency, both in Viscusi’s 
own work and in this field generally, for regulatory assessments to 
bootstrap such data into concrete without qualifying it as the inferential 
leap that it is.  Policymakers would do well to recover from CBA 
enthusiasts the measure of uncertainty that their own analyses often reveal.  
I suppose one should regret any number of statistical murders.  But might 
not we feel somewhat differently if the number is 20,000 (or 200,000) 
annually?  Very modest changes in econometric assumptions can generate 
order-of-magnitude changes. 
73
Defining health expenditure for purposes of measuring the “propensity 
effect” is very difficult, and relies on proxies that are unlikely to capture 
heterogeneous preferences perfectly.  Gym memberships, health insurance, 
refraining from eating fatty foods, and drinking a daily glass of wine are all 
activities that can be expressed as expenditures, although they have 
different consequences and implicate preferences that cannot be generically 
described.  Again, I take it that (as Viscusi tantalizingly suggests is true of 
smokers’ behavior) action in one health-related domain is unlikely to be 
totally uncorrelated with action in another.
  Viscusi’s observation seeks to instantiate the inevitable tradeoff at 
the level of individual health expenditures.  I do not find this persuasive for 
several reasons. 
74
Second, an early study on this subject observed great income elasticity, 
which is what one would expect.  In other words, the propensity effect falls 
sharply above modest incomes.
  But the correlation would 
have to be high, and the effect uniform, if we are to predicate quantitative 
policy on such observations. 
75
 
 72. See ACKERMAN & HEINZERLING, supra note 
  This is not surprising.  In the absence of 
7, at 54 (attributing to John Graham the 
term “statistical murder” to describe the risk-risk tradeoffs implied by regulatory 
expenditures). 
 73. See Frank Ackerman, The Unbearable Lightness of Regulatory Costs, 33 FORDHAM 
URB. L.J. XX (2006). 
 74. Viscusi, Monetizing the Benefits, supra note 2, at XX. 
 75. ACKERMAN & HEINZERLING, supra note 7, at 57. 
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a serious medical condition, how much health expense does one need?  
Once a threshold of averageness or typicality is reached (say, the 
approximately $10,000 it costs to insure a family of four), it is implausible 
that additional income will linearly be spent on health care.  Even more 
problematic for Viscusi’s claim is that marginal expenditures above a 
certain range are highly unlikely to return equivalent health benefits. 
For example, I wear very expensive glasses.  This is due to a 
combination of the stylish frames I fancy and my preference for the 
thinnest possible lens.  This is called “indexing,” and the process easily 
doubles the cost of my lenses.  Undoubtedly, I could not afford this 
indulgence if I earned half of my present salary, but in no way does this 
improve my health; it just makes me think I’m more attractive to women.  
That is perhaps an important determinant of my mental health, but it strains 
credulity to suppose that if 35,000 people each spent $200 less on 
eyeglasses, one of them will wind up dead.  I imagine that Viscusi would 
agree with this, but he does not sufficiently qualify his observations to 
confirm that they cannot be taken literally across all iterations of health 
expenditure. 
 A similar problem appears when one considers the distribution of 
regulatory costs.  Viscusi’s analysis lends itself to the characterization of 
distributional uniformity; that is, one imagines that the regulatory “tax” is 
imposed per capita, making possible the easy arithmetic that leads to a 
marginal reduction in health expenditure.  But there are no environmental 
regulations that actually work this way.  We may divide regulatory burdens 
into two categories.  The first, direct burdens, extract resources from 
citizens (say, the administrative expenses of the Enviornmental Protection 
Agency (EPA)).  Many regulatory burdens, however, are indirect.  For 
example, the EPA requires pollution controls, the costs of which are likely 
to be passed on to consumers. 
Direct burdens are not distributed equally.  Many people pay no income 
tax at all, which means they will only receive the benefits of health and 
safety measures funded by the government.  It is interesting to observe that, 
assuming the propensity effect does in fact fade with income, there may be 
little to it at the income strata where people are actually burdened. 
Of course, certain direct burdens are broad-based.  Many people who do 
not pay income tax pay taxes on gasoline.  Again, however, the distribution 
of gasoline taxes is not uniform.  People who live in rural areas are far 
more likely to pay that tax than people who live in New York City. 
Indirect regulatory burdens also have complex distributional 
consequences.  Like the gasoline tax, these burdens only affect people who 
consume the safety- or health-regulated product.  Imagine a coal plant in 
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the Midwest subject to stricter emissions controls.  If those costs are passed 
on in their entirety to consumers (rather than being partially borne by 
shareholders in the form of lower dividends, a possibility Viscusi does not 
acknowledge in sketching out his broad claims), they will indeed reduce 
the income of Midwesterners.  That is unfortunate, but will not be of 
immediate concern to residents in New England, which draws a large share 
of its electrical power from nuclear energy.  Interestingly enough, they 
happen to begrudge Midwestern industry for acid rain.76
Another very serious problem anticipated by my eyeglasses example is 
the presumed insensitivity of the propensity effect to the amount of 
expenditure.  An evenly distributed direct regulatory burden of $1 billion is 
less than a penny a day.  Does Professor Viscusi believe that this is likely 
to lead to even a single loss of life?
 
77
The point here is not that there could not be a reduction in health 
expenditure attendant to health and safety regulation.  Rather, the 
heterogeneity of any such reductions and their consequences simply cannot 
be captured by applying Viscusi’s 0.1 figure across all regulatory domains 
and populations.  To be sure, actually tracing these effects with empirical 
certainty would be a daunting task.  I do not begrudge Viscusi for 
attempting to address the risk-risk question efficiently, but must note that 
this limits what we can do with his observations. 
 
Finally, one cannot miss the one-way character of Viscusi’s analysis.  
Viscusi acknowledges that regulations may have collateral benefits that 
may offset the collateral risks on which he focuses.78
For example, space program enthusiasts regularly point out the many 
technologies—Velcro, Tang, new radios, fuel cells—said to stem from our 
explorations.  While it would be difficult to quantify their economic effects, 
it seems likely that the “We Spent $20 Billion Going Into Space and All 
We Got Were These Lousy Paperweights!” position would be incomplete. 
  Perhaps this is a 
matter of comparative advantage, but I am at a loss to understand why an 
economist would choose to focus on one side of an equation. 
Where is the Tang in Viscusi’s analysis of environmental regulation?  In 
his paper, John Graham makes a similar elision with respect to indirect 
burdens.79
 
76 Acid Rain Impact Remains a Concern, CNN.COM , Mar. 21, 2001, 
http://archives.cnn.com/2001/TECH/science/03/26/acid.rain.report/index.html (last visited 
Apr. 21, 2006).  
  But, many of these are largely wealth-transferring, not wealth-
 77. This example is drawn from a similar observation by Ackerman and Heinzerling.  
See ACKERMAN & HEINZERLING, supra note 7, at 57-58. 
 78. Viscusi, Monetizing the Benefits, supra note 2, at XX. 
 79. John D. Graham et al., Managing the Regulatory State: The Experience of the Bush 
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destroying regulations.  For example, requiring new low-sulfur fuels or 
advanced smokestack scrubbers means more dollars flowing into the 
sulfur-reduction and scrubber-manufacturing industries.  I suspect these are 
fairly profitable businesses in which to work.  Of course, nothing is free.  
Presumably, transactional friction will mean that transfers are not perfectly 
efficient.  But, this does not imply that the money simply disappears.  And, 
if there are even modest multiplier effects for those industries and workers 
fortunate enough to benefit from regulation-induced demand, the net 
effects may be positive. 
I certainly can express no opinion on whether this is typically the case 
with environmental regulations.  But it is unfortunate that Professor Viscusi 
focuses on the (broadly speaking) deregulatory implications of ancillary 
risk tradeoffs.80
One Nation Under Economists? 
  “Benefit multiplier” effects may be harder to measure, but 
from the perspective of causation, their propinquity to regulation seems 
equal to the “risk-risk” tradeoffs Viscusi emphasizes.  As someone who 
welcomes economic insights into legal thought, it is frustrating to see 
Viscusi giving political opponents of CBA—who assume it can only favor 
big business—such an obvious opportunity. 
While I am very evidently not an economist, many of the concerns 
sketched above may be described as methodological.  It is only fair to 
acknowledge that while I am comfortable with my intuitions (who isn’t?), 
many of these concerns must penultimately be left to economists to resolve. 
I say “penultimately” because the goal of the CBA project is to inform 
and guide public decisionmaking.  But those decisions are ultimately 
political.  The question is the extent to which CBA methodologies provide 
the “right” answer.  For a number of reasons, I find myself skeptical that 
market preferences, even if accurately captured, ought to be imported into 
all regulatory domains. 
Viscusi makes an interesting point about why regulatory agencies might 
validly use different VSLs for different populations.81  Returning to the 
example of airline safety, airline passengers have higher incomes than 
average, and correspondingly higher VSLs.82
 
Administration, 33 FORDHAM URB. L.J. XX (2006). 
  Viscusi suggests that when 
considering emergency lighting, or other airline safety regulation, that these 
 80. Viscusi, Monetizing the Benefits, supra note 2, at XX. 
 81. See id. at XX. 
 82. Id. 
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higher VSLs ought to be used.83  Correspondingly, where a regulation is 
addressed to the safety of the typical citizen, his lower VSL correctly 
implies that less safety is due.84
To the obvious equity concern this presents, Viscusi notes that airline 
safety regulations are not funded from a public regulatory budget, but from 
airlines.
 
85  I agree.  Thus, if airline passengers really desire greater safety, it 
is reasonable for gap-filling safety regulation to reflect this.86
Other regulations might be described as market-substitutes.  
Determining the optimal speed limit for a curvy stretch of road does not 
supplement the terms of a private contract; only the government can make 
that decision, and public policy is largely a matter of averages.  Thus, use 
of an average VSL (reflecting the typical user) is appropriate. 
 
The question is the “fit” between market transactions in safety and the 
demands citizens might make upon their government.  Markets are truly 
astonishing machines for aggregating and disseminating information.  Their 
capacity to describe external reality, however, is limited by the extent of 
participation. Putting aside the methodological qualms I described earlier, I 
assume market observations can tell us a great deal about what we might 
expect of unobserved behavior of people in the market.  These observations 
may tell us little about people who are not in the market. 
Suppose that the price of a good is $100.  That figure is only informative 
with respect to people who have at least $100.  It does not tell us much 
about the preferences of people who do not have that $100 to spend.  I do 
not argue that this is unfair, but merely observe that market-based 
valuations necessarily exclude in their entirety the preferences of non-
participants.  I call these unregistered preferences “market undervotes.” 
Market undervotes are problematic where public policy is determined by 
expressed market preferences.  Just as risky jobs are unlikely to be held by 
women, they are unlikely to be held by relatively older people.  Indeed, 
they are less likely to be held by people who are risk-averse.  What, then, 
does a risky-job wage premium tell us about the risk preferences of these 
other groups? 
Of course, there are many less risky jobs held by other swathes of the 
population, and Viscusi’s data addresses them.87
 
 83. Id. 
  Certainly, this must push 
 84. Id. 
 85. See id. at __. 
 86. Viscusi does not, however, address the proper VSL for people who rely on urban 
buses or intercity bus transit, whose lower incomes surely would imply less safety 
regulation. 
 87. See Viscusi, Monetizing the Benefits, supra note 2, at __. 
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our market valuation closer to the “true” (unobserved) preference of the 
population.  But, there are many people who do not work at all (the elderly 
or infirm),88
Of course, we do have markets for determining such preferences—
politics.  While I take seriously Viscusi’s challenge to make public policy 
science-based (rather than based on public perception), it presents two 
distinct types of problems.  First, much of the “science” on which Viscusi 
would have us rely depends on public perceptions.  After all, what are 
market data but the revealed preferences of some subset of the population?  
Viscusi notes that it might very well be a bad idea to regulate dreaded (but 
small) risks rather than larger, but less salient ones.
 or who do not consume goods with high implied safety premia 
(safe cars) as much as others.  Observed market transactions can tell us 
little about their true preferences. 
89
For example, it has taken some time for the public to accept that HIV-
infected persons do not pose a significant risk to those with whom they 
have the normal social contacts incident to daily life.
  I happen to agree, 
but am unsure how to reconcile this with his stated confidence in those 
same biases, clothed in market decisions. 
90  However, there 
remains a residue of dread, particularly where children are involved.  I have 
no doubt that were Viscusi to examine market data, supplemented with the 
view from Greensboro, he would detect that known HIV-infected teachers 
are paid less because many parents (despite knowing better, or perhaps not) 
would rather their children be taught by non-HIV-infected individuals.  
What are we to do with such information from a regulatory perspective?  
On the one hand, it reflects an exaggerated risk perception (which may be 
irrational, though not unreasonable).91
 
 88. One of the seemingly perverse insights of CBA is that we might value the lives of 
the elderly less.  Certainly, this is already true of tort law.  Should it be true of regulatory 
policy?  Many environmental regulations return benefits to the elderly, who are more 
susceptible to environmental risks.  The “senior discount” has been reflexively criticized.  
Let me confine myself to two observations.  First, discounting does not appear to account 
for the fact that the lives saved are often those of the present regulation-paying generation.  
Whether I “owe” senior citizens better air quality than I currently require is a question 
altogether different than whether I am willing to pre-fund my need for better air quality 
thirty years from now.  Second, Viscusi suggests that wage-risk premia for workers aged 
fifty-five to sixty-two are not markedly different from those commanded by younger 
workers.  Id. at XX.  Perhaps I am misreading this, but I do not see the relevance of this 
observation.  The fact is that such data tell us nothing whatsoever about the correct values to 
be assigned people over the age of sixty-two, who are not in the workforce. 
  However, an observed wage 
 89. Id.  at XX. 
 90. See, e.g., Richard Turkington, Confidentiality Policy for HIV-Related Information: 
An Analytical Framework for Sorting Out Hard and Easy Cases, 34 VILL. L. REV. 871, 888 
(1989). 
 91. For discussion on this distinction, see Greg Keating, Reasonableness and Rationality 
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differential is unmistakably a manifestation of some underlying reality.  
Which reality should govern? 
This problem suggests that one ought to comprehensively “correct” 
observed data for all kinds of irrational preferences that the market does not 
distinguish from rational ones.  If it is true that minorities do not obtain 
commensurate risk premia, these data might be treated as “market 
undervotes” to be discarded in favor of data unaffected by systemic 
racism.92
Returning to politics, we see an equally plausible and arguably more 
legitimate contender for discerning preferences: votes.  Suppose fifty-one 
percent of the voting public prefers to spend a sum equal to ten times the 
average market-derived VSL for safety and proposes to extract this sum 
from the wealthiest five percent of the public.  Generally speaking, I would 
find this pretty distasteful; Viscusi would be at his best, no doubt, in 
illustrating why such a move might be far from ideal.  But I cannot see how 
this preference is not in fact the “correct” answer—where mathematical 
correctness is largely a function of counting votes.  Of course, we do not 
subject most regulations to plebiscite, but in a democracy, agencies ought 
to act upon the preferences of the people.  Thus, if surveys or (preferably) 
an annual vote established the majority’s willingness to spend the 
minority’s money, this logically ought to provide the template for 
regulatory calculus. 
  If women are largely segmented into non-risky work (for reasons 
other than their native risk aversion), then we must adjust these figures to 
arrive at the “true” measure of wage-risk preference.  It takes little 
imagination to conceive of endless iterations of this theme, but a great deal 
of imagination (not possessed by this observer) to see how this task could 
be reliably accomplished. 
I cannot imagine that many readers will be very comfortable with this 
observation.  I certainly am not.  But I offer it as a counterpoint to Viscusi’s 
suggestion, implicit in the CBA project, that private market data clearly 
provide the “right” answer to regulatory equations.  One need not be a 
relativist to see that there are a number of contenders for truth in valuing 
life and safety.  Moreover, economics does not seem immune to the 
commonly possessed trait among academic disciplines of thinking that 
society would be much better off if only it would listen to the discipline’s 
insights.  “One Nation Under Economists”93
 
in Negligence Theory, 48 STAN. L. REV. 311 (1996). 
 is about as appealing as 
governance by law professors.  In this sense, CBA may without undue 
 92. See, e.g., Dorothy A. Brown, Pensions, Risk and Race, 61 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 
1501, 1530-38 (2004) (noting race-variant preferences in investment decisions). 
 93. My apologies to Professor Glendon. 
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cynicism be viewed as merely the latest venue-shifting game.  On this 
view, the participants relocate decision-making from messy (and often 
incoherent, contradictory, and process-encrusted) public venues to the 
OMB (pausing briefly at the Harvard Center for Risk Analysis). In other 
words, to caricature only slightly then-Professor Breyer’s ideal risk 
regulator, it turns out that the ideal risk regulator, insulated from the static 
of public misperceptions is, well, Professor Breyer!94
CONCLUSION 
 
Professor Viscusi’s paper is modest; I believe he would say that he seeks 
only to guide and inform decision-making, not substitute his judgment for a 
risk-ignorant public.  But the overall CBA project is positively Olympian in 
its confidence; to derive arithmetic expressions of our diverse, conflicting, 
and fundamentally ineffable values, it would have to be.  I believe the 
project is inevitable, and stress that I share its aspirations for rational public 
policymaking.  But I have the uneasy feeling that, like a previous Olympian 
effort involving Mt. Ossa and Mt. Pelion  (with which CBA’s layers of 
inference have altogether too much in common), its confidence is 
misplaced.95
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 94. See generally STEPHEN BREYER, BREAKING THE VICIOUS CIRCLE: TOWARD 
EFFECTIVE RISK REGULATION (1993). 
 95. I do not agree with Sally Katzen’s suggestion that the time has come to put CBA 
aside.  Sally Katzen, Cost-Benefit Analysis: Where Should We Go From Here?, 33 
FORDHAM URB. L.J. XX (2006).  Indeed, my basic concern is that the state of the art—and 
art it surely is—remains in its infancy.  There is far too much uncertainty, often unexpressed 
by CBA enthusiasts when decisions must actually be taken (careful qualifications abound in 
the literature), to make of this project a reliable metric for determining public policy.  It is a 
guide, not a map. 
